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Abstract
Defined as the differential extent to which rich countries and poor countries benefit from
various forms of information technology (IT), the global digital divide has been extensively
measured and described in national as well as international debates. The problem,
however, is that the topic is highly fragmented in the literature, with few attempts to put the
parts into a coherent analytical framework. More precisely, there has been no specific
attempt to pinpoint the main issues that influence one’s view of the importance of the
digital divide and the policies demanded by the different points of view. The goal of this
paper, accordingly, is to fill this important gap in the literature in an analytical schema that
recognizes the ways in which the impact of innovations depends heavily on how they are
generated and diffused. At each stage of this sequential process are key issues that
influence one’s view of the digital divide. It matters a great deal for instance on whether the
divide is in some sense unique, or just another manifestation of the general technological
relationship between rich and poor countries. It is also the case that the size of the divide
depends heavily on how it is measured. Yet another example is that the extent of the
potential impact of IT will influence our view of the foregone opportunities associated with
limited uptake of this technology in developing countries.
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Introduction
S
imply put, the global digital divide concerns the
starkly differential extent to which various forms of
information technology (IT) (such as the Internet,
computers and mobile phones) benefit rich countries rather
than poor countries in terms of production as well as use
(a distinction that is described below). By now, the topic
has engendered intense interest among a very wide range of
institutions at the global, international and country levels.
Yet, in spite of the huge amount of literature, there has been
no specific attempt to pinpoint the main issues that
influence one’s view of the importance of the digital divide
and the policies demanded by different points of view. The
goal of this paper is to fill this important gap in the
literature by means of an analytical schema that recognizes
the sequential aspect of the process in which the impact of
innovations depends on how they are generated and then
diffused across countries.
As shown in Figure 1, there are key issues that influence
one’s view of the importance of the digital divide at each
stage of the sequential framework. It matters a great deal,
for instance, whether one takes the view that this divide is
in some sense unique or that it is just another of the many
technical differences generated by the interaction between
rich and poor countries (as discussed in the first phase of
the diagram). At the next stage of diffusion of ITs, the size
of the digital divide may depend heavily on how it is
measured. As the last example, it is the extent of the
potential impact on growth and poverty that will surely
influence our view of the foregone opportunities associated
with limited uptake and diffusion of IT in developing
countries. Moreover, the sequential nature of the process
depicted in Figure 1 suggests that issues arising at one stage
may influence those occurring at subsequent stages. The
impact of IT may depend, for instance, on the degree to
which it is adopted in a particular country because of the
need for the critical mass to realize the potential benefits.
Following the logic of the schema, I begin with a
discussion of the generation of IT and conclude with my
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own perspective on the policies that are needed to close the
digital divide. More generally, this paper should be
considered in part as a critical evaluation of the available
literature and partly as a reflection of my own opinion
where the literature is inconclusive.
The source of the digital divide
It is well to emphasize at the very outset that IT belongs to a
special category of innovations whose emergence in society
occurs only very infrequently. In particular,
The term ‘general-purpose technology’, or GPT, has seen
extensive use in recent treatments of the role of
technology in economic growth, and is usually reserved
for changes that transform both household life and the
ways in which firms conduct business. Steam, electricity,
internal combustion, and information technology (IT)
are often classified as GPTs for this reason. They affected
the whole economy (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005: 1).
Some forms of IT (such as the Internet and mobile phones)
operate in firms as well as households. Other forms,
however, function in only one of the two institutions.
Computer-aided design (CAD) and computer numerically
controlled machine tools, for example, are found only in
firms, while certain types of software applications (such as
computer games) are used only by households.
In terms of the key issues thought to be at stake in the
digital divide debate, the enormous breadth of scope of IT,
in terms of the numbers of economic agents involved and
the variety of different (information) technologies that
serve them, has a number of implications. One of them, for
example, is that there are effectively two possible divides,
one associated with production (or, more generally, ways in
which firms conduct business) and the other concerned
with use in households.1 And for certain poor countries, it
may make sense to focus initially on closing the one divide
rather than the other (if, for instance, the capabilities
required for use are less stringent than those demanded by
actual production).2 Probably the most telling implication
of viewing information as a general purpose technology
(GPT), however, is the vastness of the scope that it
potentially affords a country for improving productivity
and efficiency and more generally for raising the overall
well-being of its members. From this point of view, as I
shall argue below, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to
view the digital divide as a ‘non-issue’.
If, as a GPT, IT does indeed differ from more routine
types of innovation, it does not automatically follow,
therefore, that the digital divide should be viewed as an
entirely new and unique aspect of the technological
relationship between rich and poor countries. My own
view is that the digital divide should be viewed instead as
part of the same general mechanism that gives rise to other
technology gaps between these two groups of countries (or,
to be more precise, between all countries ranked in terms of
per capita income). The mechanism in question was
described many years ago by Singer (1970), who referred
to it as ‘international technological dualism’. This arose, in
his view, from the acute concentration of global R&D in the
rich countries (amounting even now to more than 90%),
which would lead, as he saw it, to a situation where global
innovative activity was such as to exclude not only
developing countries but also many transitional economies,
with this large excluded group representing one reflection
of the technological dualism between countries. Singer also
recognized, however, that this globally concentrated form
of innovative activity would not necessarily constitute a bias
against developing countries as it was possible, in principle,
that
the direction of advance, the scientific and technological
priorities and the methods of solving scientific and
technological problems, were independent of where the
work is carried on. This, however, is patently not the case,
the (then) 98 per cent of research and development
expenditures in the richer countries are spent on solving
the problems which concern the richer countries, accord-
ing to their own priorities, and on solving these problems
by the methods and approaches appropriate to the factor
endowment of the richer countries. In both respects y
the interest of the poorer countries would be bound to
point in completely new directions (Singer, 1970: 62,
emphasis added).
They would point, for example, towards innovations that
are not heavily dependent on the weak infrastructure
(including telecommunications) that is found in most
developing countries; towards innovations that are not
heavily reliant on highly skilled labour and managerial
inputs; towards new technologies that are suited to local
rather than developed country institutions and income
levels. No less than with other technological divides,
however, the global divide in IT reflects the general absence
of innovations with these and other characteristics that a
specific focus on poor countries would dictate (certain
exceptions can easily be cited).3 As such, the global digital
divide seems in essence to reflect yet another technological
gap, derived from the same source, rather than an entirely
new aspect of the relationship between rich and poor
countries (though, of course, there are certain distinctive
aspects of the global digital divide, such as the fact that
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Figure 1 The analytical schema.
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ability of multinational corporations to globalize their
research operations).4
And again, in common with other innovations emanating
from the rich countries, the advances in IT can be expected
to exhibit systematic patterns of adoption and diffusion
within and between different countries. In the first place,
one might expect IT (and new technology in general) to be
most extensively adopted in countries that most closely
resemble the socio-economic features of developed coun-
tries, or, more simply, countries with per capita income
levels closest to those in the industrialized parts of the
world. Relatedly, one should expect to find that, within
countries, IT takes hold predominantly in those sectors that
most closely approximate the conditions prevailing in the
innovating country. In general, this means urban sectors
with relatively high incomes and education levels. Note in
this regard that, even in the most prolific innovator of IT,
the United States of America, a fierce debate has raged over
the digital divide between different segments of the
population, a debate that has many parallels with the issues
raised in connection with the global divide. For example, a
2002 report by the US Department of Commerce purported
to show that poorer families in that country were adopting
the Internet more rapidly than richer families, leading some
observers (such as Compaine, 2001) to suggest that the
digital divide was closing quickly.5 Others, however, refuted
this conclusion based, for example, on the recognition that
‘the annual growth rate is biased toward groups with low
initial percentages’ (Martin, 2003: 4), or on the view that
there are unique aspects of the Internet, such as the
required cumulative set of sophisticated skills, which make
it different from other forms of communication media
(Mason and Hacker, 2003).
Let us now examine how these implications of interna-
tional technological dualism are reflected in actual patterns
of adoption and diffusion with respect to those forms of IT
that are especially prominent in the digital divide debate,
namely the Internet and mobile telephones. These technol-
ogies have the advantage of capturing both firm and
household adoption, and they are, furthermore, the only
forms of IT for which reliable cross-country data are
available.
Adoption and diffusion of ITs in rich and poor countries
As a summary first view of the current state of the digital
divide, Table 1 contains data on the diffusion of the
Internet and mobile phones for the four country income
categories used by the World Bank, namely, the high-
income, upper-middle-income, low-middle-income and
low-income countries. For both technologies, the divide is
reflected, as expected, in a clear tendency for the entries in
the table to vary positively with the income level of the
country grouping. More precise estimates of the role played
by income and other factors in explaining the digital divide
have been undertaken by a number of authors (Dewan
et al., 2004; Chinn and Fairlie, 2004). These cross-country
studies are useful, among other reasons, because they are
able to separate the influence of income from numerous
other closely related variables such as education. Indeed, a
review of most of this literature finds ‘a few results that are
fairly consistent: national income and infrastructure are
important factors in IT penetration levels, and depending
on the countries examined, education and policies are also
important’ (Dewan et al., 2004). Not only therefore, do
these findings rigorously confirm the summary pattern
shown in Table 1 (confirming the existence of digital
divides among each pair of country groupings shown
there), but they also draw attention to the other major
variables along which countries vary in terms of their
digital penetration. In the language of the previous section,
these other variables represent the most important respects
(other than income) in which socio-economic differences
between rich and poor countries contribute to international
technological dualism. (Evidence can also be adduced in
support of the predicted pattern of internal technological
dualism, but it is thus far based on evidence drawn from
relatively few developing countries.)
What has attracted most attention in the most recent
debates about the diffusion of IT in rich vs poor countries,
is not so much the evidence presented so far in this section.
Today, the principal concern relates to the change in the
extent of the digital divide over the last decade or so.
Consider, for example, what occurred over the period from
1994 to 2004, as shown in Table 2, where the division into
developed and developing countries conforms approxi-
mately to the division between high-income countries and
other countries in Table 1.
For 1994, the table indicates the number of Internet users
and mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants in
developed and developing countries (with the numbers of
mobile phone subscribers shown in Table 2b). In particular,
there were at that time, 2.18 Internet users per 100
inhabitants, in the developed countries in contrast to the
figure of 0.03 for the developing world. For mobile phones
the corresponding figures were 5.2 and 0.19, respectively.
Measured in relative terms, the size of the digital divide
shown in the last row of Table 2 reflects the fact that there
Table 1 Diffusion of IT by country groupings, 2004




High-income countries (e.g. UK, USA, Japan) 480 767
Upper-middle-income countries (e.g. Seychelles, Mexico, Malaysia) 133 490
Low-middle-income countries (e.g. Thailand, Honduras, Namibia) 70 255
Low-income countries (e.g. Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Pakistan) 20 48
Notes: Figures are averages of the four country groupings.
Source: World Bank (2006).
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were, respectively, 73 and 27 times more Internet users and
mobile phones in rich countries than in poor countries.
(Note that the divide can also be measured in absolute
terms, as the subtraction of the two amounts, rather than a
division of the one by the other.)
By 2004, however, marked reductions had occurred in
the size of (the relative) digital divide for Internet users as
well as mobile phone subscribers. In the former case, the
divide shrank from as much as 73 to 8 and in the latter from
27 to 4 (though, in both cases, the size of the absolute gap
increased by very large amounts).6 Underlying these
changes are, of course, higher average annual rates of
Internet use and mobile subscriptions in the developing
countries. One’s view of how important the digital divide
actually is will thus tend to be heavily influenced by
whether this concept is measured in absolute or relative
terms. In the former case, the growing division between the
stock of IT in rich and poor countries, would be viewed
with considerable concern. In the latter case, by contrast,
the more rapid growth of this technology in developing
countries presents a more optimistic picture. It turns out,
however, that one cannot simply focus on one rather than
the other measure as they are related to one another. In
particular, the size of the absolute divide determines how
long it will take a given relative advantage in favour of
developing countries to catch up with the developed
countries. Conversely, for any given absolute divide, it is
the rate at which higher growth occurs in the poor
countries that is important, for the duration of the
catching-up process. Either way, though, the relative
concept is important and a key issue is what the higher
recent growth rates achieved in those countries imply for
the future course of the digital divide.7
For some authors such as Fink and Kenny (2002), the
rapidity with which the relative digital divide has already
begun to close signals that the issue is much less formidable
than was originally thought and, indeed, is no more
problematic than earlier divides in technologies such as
television, radios or even air conditioners. To quote from
those authors, ‘The most stunning feature of the digital
divide is not how large it is, but how rapidly it is closing’
(Fink and Kenny, 2002). Nor, in their view, is there any
reason to suppose that the rate of diffusion of IT will fall
behind that of developed countries in the future. On the
contrary, ‘if history is any guide, growth rates are likely to
remain higher in the developing world’. For other writers,
by contrast, much more caution needs to be exercised in
extrapolating the recent trends shown in Table 2 into the
future, or, interestingly, in a very similar debate, extra-
polating recent data from the United States, which shows
that computer and Internet use are ‘increasing most rapidly
among the poor and other disadvantaged groups’ (Martin,
2003: 2). Perhaps the most fundamental problem these
authors have with simple extrapolations of recent trends is
that the growth rates of IT in developing countries have a
base level of almost zero (see Table 2). From that negligible
level, simple arithmetic shows that even only minor
absolute increases will register as phenomenally high
growth rates with a correspondingly impressive shrinkage
of the digital divide (James, 2006a).
Another reason for doubting that recent trends in the
diffusion of IT can be easily extrapolated into the future has
to do with the distinctive nature of the technology itself.
Mason and Hacker (2003: 45), for example, argue that ‘The
Internet and IT in general are not the same as previous
communication media’. Because whereas advances in say
radio and television ‘fall along the lines of improved
quality, advances in IT allow for increasingly complex
tasks, requiring a cumulative set of sophisticated digital
skills’. Such skills, they rightly suggest, are ‘hardly
comparable to owning a radio or TV set’. The demanding
user capabilities associated with the Internet assume
particular significance in the context of future develop-
ments in the global digital divide. In contrast to developed
countries, only a minority of the population in the Third
World (typically those with relatively high incomes,
advanced levels of education and skills and resident in
urban rather than rural areas) is likely to possess these
capabilities. Insofar so far as it is this minority that first
adopts the Internet, as available evidence suggests, adop-
tion is likely to become significantly more difficult from a
capabilities point of view as shown schematically in
Figure 2.
Mobile telephony, one should note, suffers much less
from the constraints of user capabilities and to this extent
(in combination with a relatively low entry price) may
witness a more rapid closure of the digital divide, especially
in the poorest regions where the lack of user capabilities is
Table 2 The digital divide 1994–2004
1994 a 2004 a
(a) The Internet
Developed countries 2.18 53.8
Developing countries 0.03 6.7
Size of the digital divide (relative terms) 73 times more 8 times more
(b) Mobile phones
Developed countries 5.2 76.8
Developing countries 0.19 18.8
Size of the digital divide (relative terms) 27 times more 4 times more
Notes: aNumbers for Internet users and mobile subscribers are per 100 inhabitants.
Source: ITU (2006a).
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most pronounced (though, as noted below, it does suffer
from an affordability constraint).8
It is Africa, the world’s poorest region, that has seen by
far the most rapid rate of mobile phone subscriptions in
recent years. In particular, between 1998 and 2003 a growth
rate of 1000% was recorded, leading in the last year to an
absolute number of over 50 million. One year later, in 2004,
there were no fewer than 76 million subscribers (Gray,
2006). Tellingly, the rate of growth of Internet users
between 1999 and 2004, from 0.37 to 2.12 per 100
inhabitants was much less. This difference, however, is
not solely due to the variation in the required degree of user
capabilities noted above but also to the fact that
infrastructural problems are generally far less pronounced
in the case of mobile telephony. Whereas, for example,
connectivity is still a major problem of Internet access in
rural areas of poor developing countries in general and
Africa in particular, with mobile coverage ‘its cheapness
and ease of installation mean that [it is] growing rapidly in
many countries, as illustrated by Bangladesh, where y.
Coverage has grown from 36% in 2003 to a planned 85%
coverage by the end of 2005’ (ITU, 2006b: 12).
It bears emphasizing, however, that what is being argued
here is not that rapid future growth of mobile phones can
somehow be taken for granted. One still needs to recognize
that in the poorest countries ‘mobile ownership is still
mainly for the privileged middle class and elites in urban
areas. For many others, the costs of mobile ownership and
use remain prohibitively high’ (Donner, 2005: 2). It is true
that the number of users will always be higher than the
number of owners because of various types of sharing
mechanisms (within the household or through the rental of
telephone time), but as yet there are no data that can tell us
the exact extent of the difference between owners and users
of mobile telephony in a particular country.9
Regardless of one’s predictions about the future rates of
growth in IT, however, the digital divide described above
can only be grounds for concern (leading to policy
intervention) if there were significant benefits to IT usage
or negative consequences from non-usage. Even if both
conditions are satisfied, the question remains as to whether
and why developed countries should regard the digital
divide as an issue of concern to them. Accordingly, I now
turn to these important questions.
The impact of the digital divide
As noted in the previous section, there remain vast
numbers of those living in poor countries who have no
access whatever to the major forms of IT. But whether and
to what extent this fact will be of concern to policy-makers
in those countries depends rather heavily on the potential
gains (and losses) that access could provide.10 From an
economics point of view, the most important potential gain
is an increased rate of growth in a particular developing
country. From a social perspective, by contrast it is
arguably the impact on poverty that matters most (though,
of course, an increase in economic growth can also be
expected to have a favourable effect on those living in
conditions of poverty).11 I begin this section, therefore, by
assessing the role that IT could potentially play from these
perspectives. I deal next with the absolute losses that non-
adoption of this technology might inflict on the developing
world. Even if it turns out, however, that there are vital
potential gains at stake and that sizeable losses are being
inflicted on poor countries, it is far from obvious why this
should in any way concern the rich countries. The final part
of this section thus examines the digital divide from the
perspective of the latter countries.
The potential impact on growth
Most investigations of the relationship between IT and
economic growth have focused on developed countries and
many of them find that this technology contributes a good
deal to the growth of those economies albeit with a time lag
(e.g. Jorgenson et al., 2005). Indeed, ‘there is a general
consensus that ICTs have a clear impact on economic
growth by increasing productivity’ (ITU, 2006a). According
to Varian (2006) for example, ‘Most economists agree that
IT is a significant explanation for the post-1995 productiv-
ity surge in the United States’. One cannot, however, simply
assume that these estimates reflect the extent of the
opportunities open to developing countries, where the
impact of IT on growth has received much less attention. In
fact, there appear to be differences in the productivity gains
from the new technology even among the developed
countries themselves. According to Varian (2006), for
instance, the European economies have not enjoyed the
same productivity growth over the past 10 years as the
United States has. The difference, it seems, lies in the
effectiveness with which IT is used in the two regions.
Citing research conducted at the level of firms, Varian
indicates that organizational differences may play an
important role. ‘Just dropping a bunch of new personal
computers on workers’ desks is unlikely to contribute to
productivity. A company has to rethink how business
practices are handled to get significant cost savings’
(Varian, 2006).
In developing countries, the potential gains from
computers and other forms of IT are likely to depend on
more fundamental issues than just business practices. Here,
I have in mind the whole range of factors – such as
infrastructural weaknesses, limitations in user capabilities,
reliable maintenance suppliers and effective repair facilities
– that limit the ability of developing countries to use
technologies such as the Internet in an effective manner






Population in descending order of income share
Figure 2 Stylized distribution of Internet user capabilities by income share of
the population in a developing country. Population in descending order of
income share. Note: The point at which the curve crosses the line is chosen
arbitrarily. Source: James (2006a).
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The same problems, interestingly, have already emerged
from research into the effectiveness of infrastructural use in
developing countries rather than developed and certain
East Asian countries. In particular, Hulten (1994) has
shown how different the growth rate in Africa might have
been had they operated their infrastructural stocks with the
same effectiveness as the four Asian NICs (newly indus-
trializing countries) had. Using measures such as mainline
faults per 100 telephone calls and the percentage of paved
roads in good condition, he finds that if the former
countries had operated their infrastructure as effectively as
the latter, ‘their average growth rate would have been 0.75
per year rather than –0.20’ (Hulten, 1994: 23). To what
extent similar limitations reduce the full potential that IT
offers is hard to say, not least because of the present state of
research, which is focused almost entirely on developed
countries. Fortunately, however, there is at least one serious
study of IT and growth in developing countries that
provides us with more solid evidence of the potential now
being foregone by countries at the wrong end of the digital
divide.
The study in question was conducted by Waverman et al.
(2005) and follows on from his earlier research into the
impact of ‘modern fixed-line telecoms networks’ in the
OECD countries, which was ‘responsible for one third of
output growth between 1970 and 1990’ (Waverman et al.,
2005: 10). Waverman et al. (2005) ‘find that mobile
telephony has a positive and significant impact on growth
and this impact may be twice as large in developing
countries compared to developed countries. The result
concurs with intuition. Developed economies by and large
had fully articulated fixed-line networks in 1996 y In
developing countries, we find that the growth dividend is
far larger because here mobile phones provide, by and large,
the main communications networks; hence they supplant
the information-gathering role of fixed-line systems’ (p. 11,
emphasis in original). A few examples provided by the
authors help to get a sense of the magnitudes involved. One
of the most telling is that ‘A developing country which had
an average of 10 more mobile phones per 100 population
between 1996 and 2003 would have enjoyed per capita GDP
growth that was 0.59 percent higher than an otherwise
identical country’ (p. 11). One of the most important
conclusions of this study has a direct bearing on the
question of why the digital divide should be taken seriously
by developing countries. In particular ‘If gaps in mobile
telecoms penetration between countries persist, then y this
gap will feed into a significant difference in their growth
rates in future’ (Waverman et al., 2005: 19). Indeed, for
some developing countries, it is quite possible to imagine
them being caught in a vicious circle, where poverty inhibits
the adoption of mobile telephony, which in turn perpetuates
the initial situation.
I know of no directly comparable study with respect to
the impact of the Internet in developing countries. There is,
however, some evidence regarding the potential of this
technology to promote exports from these countries. In
particular,
The Internet can be especially valuable for firms in
developing countries because it provides opportunities to
connect to markets and participate in trade, domestic and
foreign. A recent survey of 56 developed and developing
countries found a significant link between Internet access
and trade growth – with the greatest benefits accruing to
developing countries with the weakest trade links (World
Bank, 2006: 4, emphasis added).
I have emphasized the last sentence of this citation,
because it is entirely analogous to the case of mobile
phones, which were shown to have the most positive
influence in countries with the weakest communications
linkages (such as those without a pre-existing fixed line
network). In both cases, it would seem that, the gains tend
to be greatest among the poorest developing countries.
From another point of view, however – of network
externalities – these same countries might suffer from the
problem of critical mass. In order to benefit substantially
from the societal benefits that accrue from individual
adoption of IT a certain minimum number of users may be
needed.
The potential impact on poverty
As we have just seen, the spread of one form of IT, mobile
phones, has a major positive influence on growth in
developing countries. If this increased growth also trans-
lates into less poverty, one can say that this technology
simultaneously promotes two of the most important goals
pursued by developing countries with the added possibility
of mutually beneficial interactions between them. What
then does the available evidence have to say about the
impact of growth on poverty in those countries? The
Human Development Report for 2003 provides a brief but
precise summary. In particular,
Many studies have calculated an ‘elasticity of poverty to
average income’ – the percentage decline in the head-
count poverty ratio for each 1% increase in per capita
income. A typical estimate in the vast econometric
literature, holding constant the distribution of income,
is that the poverty rate declines by 2% for each 1%
increase in average per capita income, for an elasticity of
2 (UNDP, 2003: 67).
More recently, Kraay (2005) has shown that ‘especially in
the medium-to long run, cross-country differences in
growth in average incomes are the dominant factor
explaining changes in poverty’ (p. 26).
In this indirect way, therefore, via the dual causality
between poverty and growth, it appears that mobile phones
do have a potentially crucial impact on the former in
developing countries and especially in the rural areas of
those countries that have no other means of communica-
tion. It is a potential that represents nothing less than the
opportunity for developing countries to escape from a
poverty trap, in which high poverty lowers the growth rate
and hence the ability to escape from poverty.12 Unfortu-
nately, however, the evidence concerning the direct
influence of this or any other form of IT on poverty is
very scant. Indeed, as far as I am aware, only the case of
Grameen Telecom has been at all seriously studied from
this point of view (by, among others, Bayes et al., 1999).
As an extension of the original Grameen Bank endeavour
From origins to implications Jeffrey James
289
to make small group loans to its (female) members, the idea
of the Telecom project is to lend money to a Bank member
in each village in Bangladesh for the purpose of purchasing
a mobile phone. The phone owner then sells call-time to the
other villagers, who, it seems, are willing to pay a relatively
high proportion of their incomes on this service (which,
incidentally, includes notification of any incoming calls).13
Unlike many attempts to use IT for the benefit of the rural
poor, the impact of Grameen Telecom extends well beyond
the level of a particular village or region. In fact, some
estimates suggest that approximately 45 million villagers in
Bangladesh now have access to a mobile phone, thanks to
the Telecom endeavour. Furthermore, the same basic model
has been introduced with some success in two poor African
countries, namely, Uganda and Rwanda (Grameen Founda-
tion, n.d.).
There are, of course, many other direct mechanisms
through which IT can benefit the poor, involving not just
mobile phones but also computers and the Internet. Table 3,
for example, shows some of the ways in which being
connected can and, to some extent, already does contribute
to the well-known Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
one of which is explicitly about poverty reduction, while the
others have to do with a broader range of poverty-related
measures. The extent of that contribution in actual practice,
however, remains to be established. The full list of goals and
the way in which they are measured can be found on the
site of the Millennium Project, which was commissioned by
the UN Secretary General in 2002 to address basic problems
related to extreme global poverty (United Nations, n.d.).
(These include health, education, gender equality, infant
mortality and maternal health.)
The impact of the digital divide on excluded countries
Thus far, I have been discussing only the potential benefits
of IT for (developing) countries that have not as yet
adopted it. Nothing has been said, however, about the losses
that non-adoption might entail, a situation that is to say,
where countries at one end of the digital divide inflict
absolute losses on those at the other end. Yet, this latter
possibility might potentially give the excluded countries as
much cause for concern about the divide as the former. It is
most likely to arise, as I see it, from the well-established
connection between IT and comparative advantage in
international trade14 and in particular the connection that
resides in the way this technology originates and spreads
unevenly across countries. For, as described in earlier
sections, the origin of most innovations imparts a
systematic tendency for them to be adopted in rich rather
than poor countries. Because of the competitive advantages
thus bestowed on the former in the realm of international
trade, one has to wonder whether this will undermine the
manufactured exports from poor countries in a process
referred to as ‘comparative advantage reversal’.
The process is best illustrated in the textiles and
garments industries, which traditionally have been domi-
nated by labour-intensive products from developing
countries (in most of which, moreover, these industries
comprise a relatively high proportion of manufactured
exports). The introduction of process innovations in IT has
allowed manufacturers in developed countries to counter
the advantages of cheap labour with speed and flexibility in
segments of the garment industry that are especially prone
to sudden changes in demand (which for the most part
means the more fashion oriented and brand conscious
segments of the industry). Indeed, ‘best practice American
producers can now deliver orders with just a few days’
notice, something overseas suppliers have difficulty achiev-
ing. These US firms do so through electronic data
interchange (EDI) automated distribution centers, and
sophisticated inventory management’ (Abernethy et al.,
1999: 8). In a manner that is similar to the role played by
just-in-time techniques in the automobile industry, the so-
called ‘lean retailing’ has shifted the comparative advantage
of many types of garment back to the United States and
other developed countries. A more recent model of lean
production in the clothing market can be found in the
operation of the Spanish retailing firm ‘Zara’, which
routinely creates and rapidly replenishes small batches of
new products. Zara is frequently able to compete with high-
fashion houses on the basis of both speed to market and
price, by supplying virtually identical products made with
cheaper fabric. This ‘fast fashion’ concept relies on a
continuous flow of information within every part of the
firm’s supply chain (Ferdows et al., 2004).
Not all developing countries suffered from a correspond-
ing reversal of their comparative advantage based on low
labour costs. What seems to have occurred instead is that
multinational firms have often sought a combination of
quick turnaround and low production costs by locating in
countries near the US and Europe.
Table 3 The potential impact of IT on selected MDGs (at the national level)
Inputs Outcomes
Poverty reduction Wider diffusion of ICT access among farmers Increased annual income (e.g. from increased
market income due to better price information)
Universal primary
education
Increased number of teachers trained,
using ICT-supported in-service training
More pupils taught where training supported
by ICT
Gender equality Number of ICT activities directed at
women trained
Positive changes in women’s status and
employment based on ICT
Child mortality More connected rural clinics Lower mortality rates in ICT-supported clinics
Combat HIV/AIDS New opportunities to access advice by
phone or online
Fewer new cases of HIV/AIDS and improved
treatment for those who are infected
Source: ITU (2006a, Table 5.1).
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The United States imports so much from nearby
countries primarily because their products arrive quickly.
The Wal-Mart model that now dominates retailing
requires apparel suppliers to replenish products on a
weekly basis. As that model took over in the 1990s, so too
did the advantage of sourcing certain apparel items closer
to the US market so that products could be manufactured
and delivered more rapidly. This also explains how some
segments of the US apparel industry have survived even
with cheaper labor elsewhere in the world. Costs remain a
driving factor, but the proximity advantage will grow
even greater in a post-quota world as retailers raise the
bar even higher on the responsiveness and flexibility
required of their suppliers. (Abernethy and Weil, 2004).
Countries far from major markets on the other hand
suffered a decline in market share, as Abernethy et al.
(1999) demonstrate for the period between 1991 and 1997
in the United States. The major losers were Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Korea, whose collective share in US apparel
imports declined from 38 to 16% over that period
(although, of course, other factors may also have played a
role). Much of that decline accrued to the United States and
other developed countries. Assuming that the total size of
the US market did not increase proportionately, those
countries can be said to have experienced a comparative
advantage reversal. Not all developing countries that are
located far from a major developed country market,
however, are at risk in this regard. Some of them, such as
those in Sub-Saharan Africa, tend to produce relatively low-
quality (non-fashion-prone) garments for regional markets.
Others, even those producing for developed country
markets, specialize in garments for the low-end, price-
conscious market segments that are driven by costs rather
than fashion and brands. The general point, however, is
that the risk of comparative advantage reversal is not
uniform across developing countries.
Looking at the future, on the other hand, what does seem
inevitable (as noted in the previous citation) is growth in
the high end of the market for goods such as clothing and
footwear, which are characterized by rapid changes in
demand, brand consciousness and fast turnaround times
(sometimes referred to as the ‘new competition’ in world
trade). The reason for this is that as incomes grow
consumer demand shifts inexorably in favour of products
that are intensive in ‘fashion’ relative to basic or functional
characteristics. This shift can only become more pro-
nounced in a globalized world where the availability and
desirability of such fashion-intensive goods become ever
more apparent, as a result of the spread of television and
Western advertising media in even remote parts of the
Third World.
Should developed countries be concerned about the digital divide?
In this section, the question that remains to be asked is why
the digital divide need be of any concern to the developed
countries. The answer is far from obvious as it is these very
countries that benefit most from the adoption and diffusion
of technologies such as mobile phones, the Internet and
CAD/CAM (computer-aided design and manufacture). And
indeed, there is one influential school of thought that views
any form of global inequality as being ‘irrelevant’
(Milanovic, 2005). It is thought to be irrelevant partly
because there is no global government and there is no
global civil society. According to this view, national
inequalities matter because ‘they become a stuff of political
discourse; they are used to form political parties, platforms,
to organize interest groups. But at the global level none of
that exists because there is no global polity’ (Milanovic,
2005).
Another school by contrast, sees global inequality in
general and the digital divide in particular in ethical terms,
which imply among other things, that ‘the rich world
cannot disown all interest in global poverty and inequality;
to some extent, the fate of every individual in the world
affects us. Distributional justice within a nation, and in the
world as a whole, is y from an ethical perspective y the
same thing’ (Milanovic, 2005). By the same ethical logic, the
rich world cannot simply ignore the digital divide, since it
is an important source of global inequality. The United
Nations certainly sees the digital divide from this ethical
perspective, because it impedes poor countries from
entering the information age and perpetuates this condition
(Spinello, 2005).
Ultimately, however, it is on the basis of economic self-
interest that the rich countries may become concerned over
the digital divide and more specifically in the form of
multinational corporations with headquarters in those
countries. According to one prominent theory, for example,
it is the digitally excluded countries that are becoming
especially attractive targets for foreign investments in IT.
‘The real source of market promise’ according to this view,
‘is not the wealthy few in the developing world, or even the
emerging middle-income consumers: It is the billions of
aspiring poor who are joining the market economy for the
first time’ (Prahalad and Hart (2002: 3) emphasis in
original). The basis for this view is essentially that certain
products, including ITs, can profitably be designed for the
poor on a large scale with low profit margins. Via its Indian
subsidiary, for example, Unilever designed a low-cost ice-
cream product that was based on ‘an inexpensive and
reusable heat shield that could keep the product cold for
24 h and replaced the need for refrigeration in vending
machines’ (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002: 12). Although
the new product sold at only about 0.04 dollars per serving,
its profitability was based on a rapid and wide acceptance
among the poor.
As regards IT itself, there are already many examples of
innovations designed by Western multinationals for poor,
digitally excluded groups in developing countries. I can cite
but a few. Multinational firms such as Motorola and
Vodafone are selling ultra low-cost mobile handsets in poor
developing countries. Other multinationals are selling
computer training courses for low-income groups using
large numbers of telecentres and local languages. Still
others are beginning to provide telecentres in rural areas of
developing countries, places where various types of IT are
made available at very low cost. The problem, however, is
that at this stage the amount of interest exhibited by
multinationals in ventures involving IT for poor users
seems to be globally rather limited (however profitable
many such ventures may seem to be). Only time will tell
whether these firms are willing and able to provide a major
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self-interested response to the digital divide on behalf of
rich countries.
From the supply-side point of view, much of the
responsiveness shown by firms in developed countries may
depend on the degree to which these firms see a need to
transfer knowledge about IT to (small) local enterprises that
supply them with inputs. For, as noted above in the
discussion over GPT, the information revolution is as much
about firms as it is about households and it may be the case
that multinational firms need to impart technological knowl-
edge about this proprietary technology to local firms (in
order, say, to satisfy certain demands about quality). In
general, the ability of a developing country to obtain
knowledge about IT from firms based in industrialized
countries is likely to depend on the bargaining power it can
exert over such firms. Demands made by the Brazilian or
Chinese government to share technology, for example, are
backed by a very large and relatively affluent local market.
This factor, too, must be added to the variables described
earlier in this section, which have a bearing on the question of
whether developed country enterprises are likely to respond
positively to the challenge of reducing the digital divide.
Bridging the digital divide
I located the source of the digital divide in the tendency for
IT to be generated in and for the socio-economic conditions
prevailing in rich countries rather than poor countries. It is
this tendency that largely accounts for the skewed pattern
of diffusion of the Internet and mobile phones in favour of
the former countries, who are then far better able to exploit
the advantages that these technologies afford. From this
way of looking at the issue, it follows that the challenge of
bridging the digital divide lies, to a large extent, in finding
alternative ITs and institutions that better meet the needs of
poor people in poor countries (by institutional change, I am
referring specifically to alternatives other than ownership as
a means of exploiting the opportunities afforded by the new
digital technology).
Early efforts tended to focus on the hardware/software
part of the problem. One can point, for example, to the
recycling of ‘obsolete’ computers from developed to
developing countries, to the design of ultra low-cost
computers (such as the ‘Simputer’ in India; to indigenous
innovations of wireless local loop (WLL) technology such
as ‘CorDect’ in that country; to the promotion of open-
source technology and to combinations of low-cost
computers and software applications).15 It gradually
became apparent, however, that unless alternatives to the
developed-country institution of private ownership could
be found, only a very small number of persons would be
able to exploit the benefits of IT. As I noted above, it is
difficult for many of those living in rural areas of
developing countries to purchase even low-cost mobile
phones, let alone computers and Internet connectivity
(which is not to say, of course, that alternative forms of
these technologies have no role to play under alternative
institutional arrangements. Indeed, the best options seem
to me to be precisely those that combine hardware/software
innovations with new institutional forms).
Changes in the institutional context tend to take two
basic forms, depending on which of the two primary
assumptions of the ownership model are rejected. The first
of these assumptions is that use derives entirely from
ownership while the second is that the benefits of IT are
extracted by the individual or the household (James,
2006b). ‘In the case of the first assumption, institutional
change needs to replace ownership as a means of gaining
use of ITs, whereas in the second case the task is to find
ways of gaining benefits of these technologies without any
individual use of them whatsoever’ (James, 2006b: 90).
Generally speaking the latter option will be most relevant in
cases where the gap between actual and required user
capabilities is very large (as is often the case with the
Internet in rural areas), whereas the former will apply to
circumstances in which that gap is small or non-existent (as
is the case, most obviously, with mobile phones). In the
case of mobile phones the need is to find sharing
mechanisms of one kind or another, whereas in the case
of the Internet, what are needed are innovations that enable
even the rural poor to benefit without any individual use of
this technology whatsoever. Table 4 presents a selected
Table 4 Illustrative cases of institutional change in mobile phones and the Internet
Institutional change to expand users Institutional change to derive benefits without use
Mobile phones The Internet
(a) Non-commercial (a) Face-to-face intermediation
Sharing a mobile phone by the
friends and family of owners
Rural Internet kiosks that are operated by people familiar
with the technology and the local community
(enabling poor, illiterate rural inhabitants to have e-mails sent
and government documents received).
(b) Commercial (b) Distance intermediation
K Buying time from vendors situated in
villages, small towns, roadside kiosks
Community radio stations that transmit, translate and
contextualize information from the Internet for the benefit
of listeners (even those living in remote, rural areas).
K People who cannot afford a mobile phone
use prepaid cards to make calls from a
handset belonging to someone else
Source: James (2006a).
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sample of institutional changes that have already taken
place with regard to both forms of IT.
There is an important difference between the types of
examples shown in the two columns. In particular, whereas
those that involve mobile phones are about different forms
of sharing arrangements, the entries in the second column
depend entirely on the existence of an intermediary who
comes between the technology and the users (such as the
persons who broadcast radio programmes on the basis of
the Internet or those who sell Internet services in rural
kiosks to illiterate, poor rural inhabitants). Note, however,
that this sharp division between mobile telephony and the
Internet is somewhat overdrawn in practice. The long-
awaited $100 laptop designed by the MIT Media Lab to run
on wind-up technology illustrates this point with particular
clarity as this innovation is not meant for private ownership
or for use only by an intermediary. It is designed instead to
be owned by governments and made available for use by
schoolchildren.
The problem with these and (similar) institutional
mechanisms is not that they do not work. Indeed, each of
them currently benefits a large number, running typically
into the millions of people in developing countries (recall,
in this regard, the Grameen Telecom initiative that reaches
some 45 million villagers in Bangladesh, and note also that
in African countries each owner of a mobile phone shares it
with five or six family members, not to speak of close
friends).16 The problem is rather that these examples have
not penetrated more widely. Referring again to the
successful Grameen case, for example, I noted above that
it has thus far been replicated in only two African countries.
As I see it therefore the focus of policy should be on
replicating (where relevant) the existing (successful)
models and discovering new institutional forms that are
appropriate to developing, rather than developed countries.
And this should be done, as far as possible, in conjunction
with suitable hardware innovations. Sharing schemes to
widen access to mobile phones, for instance, should also
include ultra low-cost handsets (at least in Africa, for
example, ‘the actual cost of the mobile handset is one of the
key inhibitors to ownership, pointing to an area of
intervention in promoting increased access’; Tusubira
et al., 2005: 172). Or again, a successful privately owned
Indian firm called ‘n-Logue’ was established on the basis of
low-cost WLL technology combined with rural Internet
kiosks (Jayaraman, 2002).17 The logic behind this endea-
vour is that the cost of setting up a rural Internet kiosk is
substantially reduced, thereby making it attractive to local
entrepreneurs who offer Internet services to a relatively
large number of villagers in the area. This model too,
however, has not been spread anywhere near as widely as it
should have.
The general point here is not that replication is an easy
process. Far from it, but whereas there are any number of
‘success’ stories to be found in the literature on IT and
development, the issue of replication has suffered from
comparative neglect.
Conclusions
One of the more paradoxical aspects of the literature on the
digital divide is that although it is so voluminous it contains
remarkably little reliable evidence on the most crucial
debates on the topic. Too much of the research effort has
gone into the niceties of measuring the divide18 and too
little has been devoted to establishing whether the topic
warrants the attention that has been lavished on it.
These observations notwithstanding, such data as are
available do throw some useful light on the questions posed
at the outset of the paper (as opposed to all possible
questions that arise on this very large topic). One body of
evidence showed, for example, that the pattern of diffusion
between and within countries closely reflects what the
notion of technological dualism would tend to predict and
that this outcome in turn skews the impact of IT in favour
of rich countries (thus validating the usefulness of the
analytical schema presented in Figure 1, which emphasizes
the interconnections between the generation, diffusion and
impact of technical change). The second conclusion is that
mobile phones represent an enormous foregone opportu-
nity for many, if not most inhabitants of developing
countries, not only in terms of economic growth but also in
terms of poverty alleviation (a conclusion that challenges
the quite widely held belief that investments in IT are
somehow necessarily inferior to direct interventions in
areas such as nutrition, education and health, among
people described as living in poverty). At the national level,
Grameen Telecom in Bangladesh stands out as an excellent
example of what can be achieved with mobile telephony.
Rural Internet kiosks represent as good an example as is
now available, of the potential afforded by the Internet for
the rural majority in developing countries. Thirdly,
although there is some evidence to support the idea that,
in some important sectors and sub-sectors (such as textiles
and clothing), developing countries can suffer from a loss
of comparative advantage (which leads to absolute rather
than relative losses), it is not, as far as I can tell, a
phenomenon that should give these countries as a whole
any major grounds for concern. All in all, though, there is
certainly enough evidence in the previous parts of the paper
to suggest that developing countries ought to take the
digital divide very seriously and all the more so given my
view that it will not automatically be closed by the free play
of market forces. I based this view partly on the belief that
once IT has been adopted by those with relatively high
incomes in developing countries, growth rates are likely to
fall off quite sharply, especially in regard to computers and
Internet connectivity.
The fourth and final conclusions are somewhat similar.
The former concerns multinationals and in particular the
finding that these firms have shown occasional interest in
making investments in IT–based projects for the poorest
groups in developing countries. Because this is a highly
encouraging development from a policy perspective,
questions arise as to whether and to what extent such
endeavours will be pursued in the future, as part of the
emerging paradigm referred to as ‘producing for the poor
profitably’ (and relatedly, what governments can do to
encourage any such tendency). Much the same sort of
issues finally arise in relation to the innovations that have
been made in hardware/software as well as in institutions,
with the aim of making ITs relevant to developing countries
rather than the rich countries in which they originate.
Although a wide range of such initiatives were shown to
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exist, they currently serve only a small fraction of those
living in the rural areas of developing countries.19 This
situation needs to be urgently addressed as these innova-
tions (especially those that involve a combination of
technological and institutional change) represent, in my
view, one of the most promising ways of bridging the digital
divide, not only in mobile phones but also the Internet. The
institutional dimension warrants special attention since, as
shown above, private ownership is not a viable option in a
developing country context where even low-cost handsets
are beyond the reach of vast numbers of people. One could,
of course, theoretically wait until incomes, education and
infrastructure have increased to the levels prevailing in the
rich countries, but that will in many cases (such as Africa)
be far off in the future, and by then gaining a foothold in
the world of IT will be much more difficult. For countries
such as India and (to a lesser extent) China, however, the
experience with outsourcing in software indicates that when
governments act to develop appropriate education, infra-
structure and access (albeit for a relatively small percentage
of the population), the market (and the forces of
comparative advantage) do engender a flow of wealth and
knowledge from the developed world.
Notes
1 Many other divides have been detected in relation to the digital
form, such as a skills divide, a cultural divide or a gender divide.
2 Note that this is not inevitably true. Some forms of production
(such as the assembly of semi-conductors) are less technically
demanding than, say, using the Internet effectively.
3 There is a clear analogy here with the ‘appropriate technology’
movement that began in the 1970s, with an avowed intention
of finding alternative technologies to those imported from the
rich world (Stewart, 1977).
4 India, in particular, appears to have benefited from foreign-
funded R&D, which takes advantage of the availability and
relatively low costs of skilled personnel in that country (Reddy,
1997).
5 Probably the best-known proponent of that view is Benjamin
Compaine, who argues specifically that ‘the digital divide is
disappearing on its own’ (2001: 334). He also sees close
parallels between information technology and earlier innova-
tions such as the automobile.
6 That alternative measures of the digital divide can give rise to
such contrasting results certainly seems worrying. For one can
then reasonably make both cases, namely, that the divide is
increasing and that it is decreasing. As I see it, however, the
issue is not really about choosing one measure over the other.
It is rather that, for given growth rates in adoption, the
absolute numbers tell us how long it will take before the
developing countries do finally catch up with the rich.
7 Note that the entries in Table 2 do not include the emerging
forms of IT such as 3G and Broadband. Since these
technologies are currently concentrated in the industrialized
countries, their inclusion in Table 2 would serve to make the
digital divide even more pronounced. For a description of
these important new forms of IT see for example ITU (2006a).
8 The requirements for the use of mobile telephony will no
doubt become more demanding in the future with the 3G
technology mentioned in the previous note.
9 This problem is, however, recognized by the ITU and certain other
international institutions, and there is a proposal to gather com-
parable cross-country data on mobile use over a 3-month period.
10 Losses may be incurred in certain political regimes that regard
information technology as subversive. The political basis of the
digital divide has been explored by Guillen and Saurez (2005),
who find that regulatory, political and social variables also
account for the global digital divide.
11 This expectation is examined in some detail below.
12 The corresponding virtuous circle is that IT promotes growth,
which in turn alleviates poverty and hence raises the prospect
of higher growth in the future.
13 This tendency for the rural population to spend relatively high
percentages of their incomes on telecom services is not unique
to Bangladesh. It is also found, for example, in many poor
African countries (Gillwald, 2005).
14 As demonstrated for instance in the Global Information and
Technology Report, 2004–5, prepared by the World Economic
Forum. In particular, the report finds that the ability of a
nation to compete in global competition is closely tied to the
extent of its use of information technology.
15 Most recently, the MIT Media Lab has introduced a $100
laptop computer, which is designed specifically for conditions
in developing countries, as reflected among other ways by its
reliance on wind-up technology. The idea is that it will be used
by schoolchildren in those countries (the so-called ‘one laptop
per child’ programme).
16 Examples of this and other types of sharing behaviour can be
found for 10 African countries in Gillwald (2005).
17 WLL is a system that connects subscribers to the public
telephone network on the basis of radio signals rather than
copper wire.
18 There are currently at least six different ways of measuring the
divide, the latest of which is the Digital Opportunity Index
(DOI) prepared by the ITU (2006c).
19 It is encouraging to learn in this regard, that perhaps the most
successful institutional innovation in information technology –
Grameen Telecom – has produced a manual to assist
replication in other parts of the developing world.
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